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ABSTRACT 
Four years of implementing the CRMP, little is known about the extent of adoption 
of the measures to improve governance in cooperatives in general and SACCOS in 
particular. Therefore this study generally intended to assess the extent of good 
governance practices adoption in cooperative societies. 
 
A sample of 25 SACCOS(15 work –based and 10 community based) were 
systematically drawn from a population of SACCOS in Dar es salaam. A 
questionnaire designed in a likert scale format to assess the extent of adoption of 
code of conduct for board and management, measures to ensure members 
participation and extent of compliance was administered to each SACCOS. 
Comparative bar charts were used to sort the attitudinal items that described the 
extent of adoption. Independent two sample t-test was used to compare the means of 
the mean scores across scale items in each of the three categories between work-
based and community-based SACCOS. 
 
The study reveals that Savings and credit Cooperative societies in Dar es salaam 
have adopted measures to enhance good governance principles. However there is 
significant differences in the extent of adoption of such measures between work-
based and community-based SACCOS .Significant differences were found in the 
areas of electing leaders as per code of conduct, disclosure of property by leaders, 
training as well as induction for board members, executive, members and staff 
performance  assessment. It is recommended that measures to empower SACCOS in 
the areas be instituted by relevant regulatory authorities.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Background to the Study 
Credit unions, often called cooperative societies, are financial institutions that 
promote thrift among their members, create a front of credit for these members, and 
play an important role in the economy of several countries (WOCCU, 2005). In 
2004, there were 43,147 cooperatives with a total of 136,299,943 members, 7.89% of 
penetration, and US$ 707,827,974,613 of savings in 91 countries. In Europe, many 
important international banks began as cooperatives: Rabobank (Netherlands), DG 
Bank (Germany), and Caja Laboral Popular (Spain). Survival of these institutions 
depends among other things the presence of governance structures, just as there are 
in corporations. 
 
Co-operative development agencies and sectoral bodies such as the World Council of 
Credit Unions (WOCCU) work to improve governance standards among credit 
unions (Shaw, 2006). A series of good practice guidelines and governance codes as 
well as relevant training programmemes have been developed and delivered 
(WOCCU, 2006). They also promote the formation of national associations to 
advocate issues affecting cooperatives on behalf of their members, influence policy 
and demand responsive governance from local and state entities. WOCCU shares the 
concern by Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) on the need to raise 
standards of governance for boards as captured here under:  
“Good corporate governance stems from clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities of the board of directors, committees and senior managers. It 
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also stems from codes of conduct which directors and staff at every level of the 
organization signs on to respect in the completion of their tasks. Sound bylaws 
and policies seek to avoid conflicts of interest and provide mechanisms for 
dispute resolution where they arise. While many factors contribute to the 
governance of an institution, good governance begins and ends with the board 
(WOCCU, 2005).”  
 
This concern of both WOCCU and CGAP visit the cooperatives in many less 
developed countries which experience serious governance problems, which may be 
due to the ignorance or complete abandonment of characteristic principles that define 
cooperatives in general and credit unions in particular (Bee, et al, 2007). However, 
some of the problems are a result of the conceptual contradictions between good 
corporate governance and some of the credit union operating principles (Bee, et al, 
2007). 
 
Deriving from their dual identity of entrepreneurial and associative nature, co-
operatives have always faced complex governance challenges even though there is a 
well established institutional framework to deal with this (Shaw, 2006). However the 
starting point has been not a common legal basis but rather shared principles which 
have provided guidelines as to how co-operatives should be owned and governed. 
These guidelines have evolved through time (CGAP, 2005). 
 
The studies (Boekhold, 2005; Co-operative Commission, 2001; Develtere, 1994) also 
confirm that good governance is central to the success and sustainability of co-
operatives in the developing as well as in the developed world. Improving board 
performance and accountability remains a central issue together with improving 
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engagement from the wider membership. However there are some issues and 
challenges in terms of corporate governance that are specific to co-operatives in 
developing countries. These include firstly, extremely low levels of participation by 
women as members and in the governance structures in their co-operative (Reed, 
2002). Secondly, there is a need to develop appropriate training and support for 
directors in the context of relatively low levels of literacy and related skills. In 
addition, conflict between members and their boards also appear to be present. This 
has been fostered by long established practices of placing government nominees on 
co-operative boards and related patterns of corruption (Taimi, 2000).  
 
The number of SACCOS in the Tanzania Mainland as at November 2007 stood at 
 4,435, with 765, 931 members. In the end of year 2008, Tanzania had 8,000 
cooperative societies facilitating attainment of different socio-economic goals and 
supporting 1.6 million families and approximately a total of 6.9 million Tanzanians 
(URT, 2005). In Tanzania, governance standards within co-operative societies have 
been perceived to be lacking. Recently, a survey of village-level coffee co-operatives 
(Shaw 2006) reported that low levels of education among cooperative societies 
leaders especially board members hindered the effective management of the co-
operative and was linked to lack of democratic control. The survey also found that in 
many cases the secretary lacked sufficient education, while the ability to act 
independently and the lack of control by members meant high levels of fraud and 
theft committed by the secretary.  
 
Another study (Boekhold 2005) reported that financial controls and record keeping 
were very weak, and suggested that members should be given education and training 
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not only on production but also in co-operative affairs. The report also pointed out 
that there is a great need for Committee members and secretaries to be trained in 
financial management as a way to create a better performance for the cooperative 
societies. 
 
Furthermore, URT (2005) pointed out that Cooperatives have failed to meet their 
objectives due to various problems including those related to governance. The 
problems include corrupt leadership, misappropriation of funds and theft, 
untrustworthy management and lack of accountability for members. The governance 
problem, though inherent in most public entities, is of greater impact on cooperatives 
since they aim at jointly solving economic problems of poor in communities, and in 
consequence the nation. The governance problems manifest into failure of the 
cooperative due to the fact that governing weakness destabilize the foundations of 
the cooperatives survival. 
 
The Tanzanian government, recognizing the fact that cooperative movement is a 
reliable instrument to fight against poverty and injustice, established various 
commissions to analyze the problems and recommend solutions. One of the results of 
these efforts was Co-operative Reform and Modernization Programme that was 
intended to formulate implementation strategies and action plan following 
recommendations made by the Presidential Special Committee on the Revival, 
Strengthening and Development of Cooperatives in Tanzania. Generally government 
interventions have also been called for to improve the governance of cooperatives. 
The Government of Tanzania interventions regarding the cooperative societies are 
aimed at realizing the following outcomes:- 
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“Economically strong cooperative societies which are capable of facing 
competitive challenges; Strong Savings and credit cooperative societies and 
cooperative banks which will provide better financial services to their members 
and be a source of capital for other types of cooperatives; A large and 
empowered cooperative membership through acquisition of education, new 
knowledge and skills;Good governance and accountability in cooperative 
societies which will in turn minimize the problems of theft, misappropriation and 
corruption in cooperatives; Cooperative societies with efficient and cost effective 
structure which can easily respond to the needs of the members; and effective 
and efficient cooperative support institutions”(CRMP, 2005:47). 
 
The recommendations made by this Committee also led to promulgation of New 
Cooperative Development Policy of 2002  and the review of the previous 
Cooperative Act No. 15 of 1991 from which the current Cooperative Societies Act 
No 20 of 2003 came into being.  The programme was designed to enable co-
operatives to become member owned, controlled and economically viable. One of its 
specific aims is to promote emergence of good governance in co-operatives. Some of 
the key governance-related challenges identified were inflexible legal environment, 
weak leadership and management, lack of member engagement and participation as 
well as lack of internal controls and checks. For example, the lack of internal control 
and checks were found to have contributed to high levels of dishonesty and 
corruption. In response, the government has taken supportive actions which include, 
among other things, making provisions for code of conduct for cooperative 
management in the cooperative Societies Act No. 20 0f 2003. Cooperative Society’s 
Rule of 2004 requires each SACCOS to have a supervisory committee charged with 
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supervisory frame work for SACCOS. The duties of the committee include ensuring 
that the SACCOS board, committees and employees abide by applicable laws, 
regulations, bylaws and established policies, to verify accounting and other records 
of the society, to oversee and receive reports of the internal auditor when appointed, 
and advise the board and executive employees of the society on good conduct of the 
business of the society and report directly to members at the general meeting. 
1.2 Statement of Research Problem 
Cooperatives in Tanzania have long history, dating back to the late 1920s. In the past 
they played a vital rural and urban economic and social development of the country. 
In Tanzania and else where in the world, cooperatives have performed a valuable 
role which remains as relevant as ever today. Without cooperatives, small producers 
are left with almost no form of collective organization, at an immense disadvantage 
when taking their products or crops to the market. Without savings and credit 
cooperatives (SACCOS), many poor people have no safe home for their savings and 
no where to go for loans. 
In order for cooperatives in Tanzania to meet their potential in future, a 
comprehensive transformation has been necessary. This has culminated among 
others, production of a key strategic document, the Cooperative Reform and 
Modernization Programme (2005-2015). Being a home grown initiative, the 
document has identified problems of poor management, inappropriate cooperatives 
structures, corruption and embezzlement, lack of cooperative democracy and 
education. Therefore, CRMP sets out detailed strategies to overcome these problems, 
one of them being to promote emergence of good corporate governance and 
accountability in Cooperative Societies. 
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The significance of corporate governance principles to an organization cannot be 
over-emphasized. Very few studies in Tanzania have been directed to the issues of 
corporate governance let alone in cooperatives. However, significant efforts have 
been made to improve governance in cooperatives (CRMP, 2005). What is not 
known for sure is the extent to which cooperatives have adopted the measures to 
improve governance practices. This study was designed to fill this gap by assessing 
the extent of adoption of the practices and provide evidence thereof. Four years of 
implementing the CRMP, little is known about the extent of adoption of the 
measures to improve governance in cooperatives in general and SACCOS in 
particular. Therefore this study generally intended to assess the extent of good 
governance practices adoption in Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies in Dar es 
Salaam. 
1.3 Research Objectives  
Generally, the study was designed to assess the extent to which good corporate 
governance practices have been adopted in Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies 
in Dar es Salaam. 
 
1.3.1 Specific Objectives 
Specific objectives of the research were: 
(i) To assess the extent to which SACCOS have adopted measures to improve 
adherence to code of conduct by the board and management. 
(ii) To assess the extent to which SACCOS provide opportunities to members’ 
participation in cooperative affairs. 
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(iii) To assess the extent to which SACCOS have complied with various 
regulation that support good governance. 
1.4  Research Questions 
Generally the study meant to answer the question, “To what extent have the good 
governance practices been adopted by Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies in 
Dar es Salaam?” 
 
1.4.1 Specific Questions 
(i) To what extent SACCOS have adopted measures to improve adherence to 
code of conduct by the board and management? 
(ii) To what extent have SACCOS provided opportunities to members’ 
participation in cooperative affairs? 
(iii) To what extent have SACCO’s various regulation support good governance?  
 
1.5 Relevance of the Research 
The significance of corporate governance to an organization cannot be over-
emphasized. Very few studies in Tanzania have been directed to the issues of 
corporate governance let alone in cooperatives. However, significant efforts have 
been made to improve governance in cooperatives (CRMP, 2005). What is not 
known for sure is the extent to which cooperatives have adopted the measures to 
improve governance practices. This study was designed to fill this gap by assessing 
the extent of practice and provide evidence thereof.  
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Moreover, this study provides information to cooperative policy makers and 
institutions interested in cooperative movement, corporate governance and associated 
lobbyists, researchers and academicians also and hence contribute to the body of 
knowledge in the fields of Corporate Governance and of Cooperatives management. 
1.6 Summary and Organization of the Dissertation 
This chapter has introduced the problem that was studied which is corporate 
governance adoption in cooperatives. General and specific questions have been 
formulated out of the objectives of the study, the relevance of the study has been 
narrated and finally the limitations to the study and counter measures have been 
detailed. The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows:  Chapter two provides a 
review of literature on good corporate governance in cooperatives. The chapter deals 
with the definitions of key concepts that comprise the key variables of the research problem. 
It establishes the relevant theories to explain the variables’ relationships and logical patterns 
of issues concerning the accountability and corporate governance practices in cooperatives 
through conceptual definitions and theories, theoretical analysis and empirical 
analysis. Chapter three details the methodology employed to carry out the research. 
Chapter four presents the findings and discussions on the findings. Chapter five is the 
final chapter which offer the conclusions, recommendations and policy implications 
of the research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Overview 
This chapter presents a review of literature on good corporate governance practices 
in cooperatives. It begins with conceptual definitions followed by the relevant theories 
to explain the variables’ relationships and logical patterns of issues concerning the corporate 
governance practices globally and in Tanzanian cooperative perspective. 
 
2.2 Conceptual  Definitions  
2.2.1   Cooperative Society   
A Cooperative society is  association of persons who have voluntarily joined together 
for the purpose of achieving a common need through the formation of a 
democratically controlled organization and who make equitable contributions to the 
capital required for the formation of such an organization, and who accept the risks 
and the benefits of the undertaking in which they actively participate (Cooperative 
Societies Act No 20 0f 2003). 
 
2.2.2 Corporate Governance   
The relationship between shareholders, creditors, and corporations; between financial 
markets, institutions and corporations; and between employees and corporations. 
Corporate governance would also encompass the issue of corporate social 
responsibility, including such as aspects as the dealings of the firm with respect to 
culture and the environment” (Claessens 2003:5). 
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2.2.3 Saccos   
A Savings and Credit Cooperative Society (SACCOs) is a cooperative financial 
institution that is owned and controlled by members, according to democratic 
principles, for the purpose of encouraging savings and using pooled funds to give 
loans to its members at reasonable rates of interest and providing related financial 
services to enable members improve economic and social conditions. They are 
known by different names in various parts of the world, People’s Bank, Credit 
Savings and Credit Cooperative Unions, Thrift and Credit Cooperatives,  cosa 
dispanio (Italy). 
 
2.2.4 Supervisory Committee  
Committee established to provide close supervision, inspection, internal check and 
control of Saccos activities. The committee reports its activities to the Annual 
General Meeting. ( Cooperative Societies Rules and Regulations 2004). 
 
2.2.5 Internal Control System   
The whole system of controls, financial and otherwise, Control system established by 
the management in order to carry on the business of an organisation in an orderly and 
efficient manner, ensure adherence to management policies, safe-guard assets and 
secure as far as possible the completeness and accuracy of records. 
 
2.3 Critical Review of Supporting Theories  
2.3.1 The Concept of Corporate Governance 
The relationship between shareholders, creditors, and corporations; between financial 
markets, institutions and corporations; and between employees and corporations.  
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Corporate governance would also encompass the issue of corporate social 
responsibility, including such as aspects as the dealings of the firm with respect to 
culture and the environment. Corporate governance also includes the relationships 
among the many stakeholders involved and the goals for which the corporation is 
governed. The principal stakeholders are the shareholders/members, management, 
and the board of directors.  Other stakeholders include labor (employees), customers, 
creditors (e.g., banks, bond holders), suppliers, regulators, and the community at 
large. For Not-For-Profit Corporations or other membership Organizations the 
"shareholders" means "members" (Williamson, 2008). 
 
Corporate governance is a multi-faceted subject. An important theme of corporate 
governance is to ensure the accountability of certain individuals in an organization 
through mechanisms that try to reduce or eliminate the principal-agent problem. A 
related but separate thread of discussions focuses on the impact of a corporate 
governance system in economic efficiency, with a strong emphasis shareholders' 
welfare. There are yet other aspects to the corporate governance subject, such as the 
stakeholder view and the corporate governance models around the world (OECD, 
2004). 
 
Parties involved in corporate governance include the regulatory body (e.g. the Chief 
Executive Officer, the board of directors, management and shareholders). Other 
stakeholders who take part include suppliers, employees, creditors, customers and the 
community at large. In corporations, the shareholder delegates decision rights to the 
manager to act in the principal's best interests. This separation of ownership from 
control implies a loss of effective control by shareholders over managerial decisions. 
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Partly as a result of this separation between the two parties, a system of corporate 
governance controls is implemented to assist in aligning the incentives of managers 
with those of shareholders. With the significant increase in equity holdings of 
investors, there has been an opportunity for a reversal of the separation of ownership 
and control problems because ownership is not so diffuse. A board of directors often 
plays a key role in corporate governance. It is their responsibility to endorse the 
organization’s strategy, develop directional policy, appoint, supervise and 
remunerate senior executives and to ensure accountability of the organization to its 
owners and authorities. All parties to corporate governance have an interest, whether 
direct or indirect, in the effective performance of the organization.  
 
Directors, workers and management receive salaries, benefits and reputation, while 
shareholders receive capital return. Customers receive goods and services; suppliers 
receive compensation for their goods or services. In return these individuals provide 
value in the form of natural, human, social and other forms of capital. A key factor is 
an individual's decision to participate in an organisation e.g. through providing 
financial capital and trust that they will receive a fair share of the organisational 
returns. If some parties are receiving more than their fair return then participants may 
choose to not continue participating leading to organizational collapse. 
 
2.3.2 Principles of Corporate Governance 
Key elements of good corporate governance principles include honesty, trust and 
integrity, openness, performance orientation, responsibility and accountability, 
mutual respect, and commitment to the organization. Of importance is how directors 
and management develop a model of governance that aligns the values of the 
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corporate participants and then evaluate this model periodically for its effectiveness. 
In particular, senior executives should conduct themselves honestly and ethically, 
especially concerning actual or apparent conflicts of interest, and disclosure in 
financial reports. 
 
Commonly accepted principles of corporate governance include: 
(a) Rights and equitable treatment of shareholders: Organizations should respect 
the rights of shareholders and help shareholders to exercise those rights. They 
can help shareholders exercise their rights by effectively communicating 
information that is understandable and accessible and encouraging shareholders 
to participate in general meetings. 
(b) Interests of other stakeholders: Organizations should recognize that they have 
legal and other obligations to all legitimate stakeholders. 
(c) Role and responsibilities of the board: The board needs a range of skills and 
understanding to be able to deal with various business issues and have the 
ability to review and challenge management performance. It needs to be of 
sufficient size and have an appropriate level of commitment to fulfill its 
responsibilities and duties. There are issues about the appropriate mix of 
executive and non-executive directors. 
(d) Integrity and ethical behavior: Ethical and responsible decision making is not 
only important for public relations, but it is also a necessary element in risk 
management and avoiding lawsuits. Organizations should develop a code of 
conduct for their directors and executives that promotes ethical and responsible 
decision making. It is important to understand, though, that reliance by 
organisation on the integrity and ethics of individuals is bound to eventual 
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failure. Because of this, many organizations establish Compliance and Ethics 
Programmes to minimize the risk that the firm steps outside of ethical and legal 
boundaries. 
(e) Disclosure and transparency: Organizations should clarify and make publicly 
known the roles and responsibilities of board and management to provide 
shareholders with a level of accountability. They should also implement 
procedures to independently verify and safeguard the integrity of the 
company's financial reporting. Disclosure of material matters concerning the 
organization should be timely and balanced to ensure that all investors have 
access to clear, factual information. 
 
Issues involving corporate governance principles include:   internal controls and 
internal auditors; the independence of the entity's external auditors and the quality of 
their audits;   oversight and management of risk; oversight of the preparation of the 
entity's financial statements; review of the compensation arrangements for the chief 
executive officer and other senior executives; the resources made available to 
directors in carrying out their duties; the way in which individuals are nominated for 
positions on the board; and dividend policy. 
2.3.3  Best Practice Corporate Governance Codes 
Corporate governance principles and codes have been developed in different 
countries and issued from stock exchanges, corporations, institutional investors, or 
associations (institutes) of directors and managers with the support of governments 
and international organizations. The renowned ‘Combined Code-Principles of Good 
Governance and Code of Best Practice (1998)’ of UK is derived from the Cadbury 
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Report (1992), Greenbury Report (1995) and Hampel Report (1998). Today it also 
constitutes the Turnbull Report (1999), Myers Report (2001) and Higgs Review 
(2003). Others include the Kings II – South Africa (2002), the Sabanese Oxley Act – 
US (2002), OECD
i
 - Europe (2004), ECA
ii
 – Africa (2002). 
 
As a rule, compliance with these governance recommendations is not mandated by 
law, although the codes linked to stock exchange listing requirements may have a 
coercive effect. In Tanzania, DSE rules derive stipulation of best practices by 
reference to Capital Markets and Securities Corporate Governance Guidelines - 
CMSCGG (2002). 
 
The scandals that called for these codes such as Maxwell, Enron, Worldcom, 
Adelphia Communications, AOL, Arthur Andersen, Global Crossing and Tyco were 
bound not only to UK and US, but also other parts of the world. Professionals and 
academics have searched extensively for explanations of recent large-scale financial 
failures. Although most of this attention has been devoted to prominent cases in the 
world’s richest nations, developing countries have not been immune from such 
difficulties (Wanyama, Burton and Helliar, 2006). Clearly, poor corporate 
governance practices could be a cause of or a contributory factor to these scandals 
and governments and private sector organizations in many countries have made 
efforts to promote high standards of behavior. This renewed interest in improving 
corporate behavior is reflected in the emergence of numerous governance guidelines 
and codes.  
 
The particular importance of a robust corporate governance regime in countries is 
evident in the fact that several recent studies have suggested that a strong system is 
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necessary to encourage inward investment and nourish long-term economic growth. 
A recent analysis of Nigeria by Okike (2007:188) reports that while efforts to 
improve governance standards in Africa are “commendable,” endemic corruption 
still exists and any improvements in practices will be dependent on strong 
enforcement mechanisms; de jure codes of conduct alone will not be sufficient to 
bring about necessary changes. Corporate governance regime in Tanzania reflects the 
relevant laws and requirements of various regulatory and supervisory authorities, 
such as the DSE, and the Capital Markets and Securities Authority – Tanzania. 
 
2.3.4 Universal Corporate Governance Issues in Cooperative Societies 
Cooperative Societies operate in an environment surrounded by communities who 
depend on them for jobs and tax revenues, customers for quality products and 
services. All stakeholders have interests in the well being of their corporation/ 
society. The organizations also operate in environment which is characterized by 
political interests, markets existence, culture, values, technology, regulations and 
taxing authorities. The following are the reasons for interest in cooperative 
governance by the community, members and the management:- 
 
First, the community needs to reassure itself that;(i) Cooperatives business 
enterprises are viable, sustainable and competitive; (ii) Cooperatives are held 
accountable and not left to run freely; (iii) Societies are competitively attractive to 
investments; (iv) Cooperatives are responsible corporate citizens; and (v) 
Cooperatives comply with legal framework and remain relevant and legitimate in 
society. Second, the members want to reassure themselves that, the cooperatives  
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business enterprises operates in a transparent manner, Members rights, fairness and 
equitable treatment of all investors, There is corporate leadership for efficiency and 
probity, Cooperatives are responsible, responsive, accountable, transparent, 
competitive and sustainable. 
 
Finally the Directors/ Executive Committee members are interested in cooperative 
governance because(i) their roles are becoming increasingly professional and much 
more demanding;(ii)they need to clearly understand their roles, duties, 
responsibilities and liabilities within the Cooperative movement; and(iii) they need to 
have adequate knowledge of the business they direct as well as good corporate 
governance principles and practices. 
 
The relationship, which directors of a cooperative have with their members, is a very 
different one from that of a board with its shareholders. As a result cooperative 
directors have full understanding and knowledge of the operations of the 
cooperatives movement. But how do cooperatives ensure appropriate and workable 
balance between the roles of the Executive Committee Members and the roles of 
management? Another related question concerns the nature and the extent of the 
responsibility, Should a board ensure strong and effective relationship between the 
members and their cooperatives or credit unions? In view of the above critical 
concerns, a cooperative model of governance has been developed by cooperative 
movement in many nations with the sole purpose of harmonizing SACCOS’ 
operations and relationships between committee members and the management. 
In Tanzania, the AGM is the supreme organ which authorizes operationalization of 
the budgets, it also give cooperatives’ borrowing powers and decides on who is to be 
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in the management committee, the Supervisory management committee bench is 
above the members. During Annual General Meeting, transparent elections for 
Executive Committee Members are held under the supervision of the cooperatives 
officials. 
 
2.3.5 Guidelines and Code of Best Practice for Cooperatives 
These are set of standards or guidelines prescribed by a legal entity / committees, 
putting in place rules that cooperatives are supposed to follow. A model that fit in 
this group includes regulatory standards. At its heart, is the premise that boards must 
focus on the ends and management on the means. Boards and committees achieve 
this by developing and approving policies and then holding management accountable 
for effectively operating the organization within these parameters; management 
implement and acts. Indeed, cooperatives have by-laws which provide clear frame 
work on how they should operate/ manage their affairs. These by-laws are highly 
guideline based as they talk procedures or policies which can address most 
challenges experienced by members. 
 
The most outstanding advantage about guideline based model is that they “solve “ 
governance  problems by providing the answers ; they are straight forward and cut 
through internal squabbles, but they provide these solutions in a blanket way, 
addressing every governance situation and every committee/ board at every time in 
the same way.  There is definitely a place for standards, guidelines and values in 
cooperatives enshrined in the cooperative governance. These have led to relatively 
stronger performance in many cooperatives. 
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2.3.6 Corporate Governance in Tanzanian Cooperatives Societies 
From the early years of its formation with the initiatives of the Rochdale Pioneers 
with the first consumer cooperative society in England (1844), the cooperative 
family recognizes the essence of embracing transparency and accountability and thus 
developed a set of rules which were to be observed as a code of conduct for running 
a consumer cooperative society. From these early cornerstones, the evolution of 
today’s internationally recognized Cooperative Principles has been inevitable. The 
cooperative values under the principle based model, (voluntary membership, 
democratic member control, member economic participation, autonomy and 
independence, education, training and information, cooperation among cooperatives 
and concern for community) are key to upholding normalcy and enhancing 
performance in cooperative fraternity. 
 
These principles outline the fundamental tenets of cooperative direction and control. 
They have the capacity and have assisted cooperatives to experience peace and 
reasonable levels of stability. It is the members who control the cooperatives, 
regardless of the rights and powers of any stakeholder group. To be precise, the 
membership – based structure of a cooperative is the feature, distinguishing it from 
an ordinary corporation- and the feature that lies at the core of its success. The 
organization is run by its members: one person, one vote. Members exercise this 
control by electing representatives to govern the cooperative on their behalf; the 
board is therefore elected directly by the members and the elected representatives are 
accountable to the membership; mechanisms, such as annual and special meetings 
and reports, always need to be put in place to ensure this. The capital of the 
cooperative in whole or part is contributed by and is the common property of the 
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members. Cooperative members can choose to raise capital from external sources, 
but do so in ways that ensure democratic control by members. While surpluses are 
allocated to developing the cooperatives, benefiting members (transaction pricing or 
rebates), providing education and training, and supporting other activities including 
the sustainable development of their communities. The committees consciously keep 
its strategies and structure aligned with the cooperative principles and members are 
kept informed through meetings and represented in and through the election process. 
Once every year, an open annual meeting is held to inform members on any changes 
likely to affect their organization. 
For the leadership to effectively serve the interests of the members, they need to 
possess the capability to use finances in the most productive manner while also 
ensuring that appropriate controls are in place. Supportive actions taken on the side 
of the Government include making provisions for code of conduct for cooperative 
management in the Cooperative Societies Act No. 20 of 2003 (The Cooperative 
Reform and Modernization Programme, 2005: page 14).Under the code of conduct 
management board are required to fill relevant forms disclosing their personal 
details/personal history and experience in cooperative leadership, level of education 
and any business/activities being undertaken. Furthermore each year every member 
of management board has to fill forms indicating property owned and submitted to 
the registrar. Thereafter the form has to be read in the annual general meeting by the 
registrar or his representative. Likewise they are not required to interfere with 
responsibilities reserved for the executive staff and every elected board member has 
to attend seminar on cooperative management  before assuming their responsibilities. 
On the other hand the appointment of executive staff is to based on the competences 
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in running activities of the cooperative society. In addition to highest scores obtained 
from an interview, officers seeking executive staff positions shall be vetted through 
the Registrar. Their application need to be accompanied by a form  indicating their 
level of education, name and address of at least two referees and two 
guarantors(Sect. 125 part III ;Cooperative Societies’ Act No. 20 of 2003). 
 
In the case of SACCOs, the effectiveness of the Board will be boosted with the 
introduction of a Supervisory Committee (CRMP, 2005) which is provided for in the 
Cooperative Societies Rules 2004. In the past, the supervisory framework for 
cooperative societies was provided exclusively by the Cooperative Department and 
COASCO. One of the weaknesses of this system is that supervision could not be 
consistently close due to practical limitations. For example the number of 
cooperatives to be supervised weighs heavily against available  internal and external 
supervisory staff. Because of this, implementation of recommended corrective 
actions are slowed down or are undermined.  
 
The other weakness is that, cooperatives lack internal capacity and remain fully 
dependent on the external support to provide solutions. With a Supervisory 
Committee in place, it should be easier to inculcate a sense of responsibility among 
the Board for ensuring that their cooperative is properly managed. The external 
support should come in the form of capacity building and for undertaking more 
intricate inspections and audit work. 
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2.4 Empirical Analysis of Relevant Studies 
2.4.1 General Studies 
There are different schools of thought on corporate governance, such as corporate 
finance perspective (e.g. Tirole, 2006; Williamson, 2008), the classical agency 
perspective (e.g. Fama and Jensen, 1983), the economic organization perspective 
(e.g. Grandori, 2004), the property rights perspective (e.g. Chaddad and Cook, 2004), 
and the stakeholder perspective (e.g. Cornforth, 2004). Roe (2005) argues that the 
core problem of corporate governance has a vertical and a horizontal dimension. The 
vertical dimension is between senior managers and distant shareholders. The focus 
here is on keeping the senior managers loyal to the shareholders, and competent to 
the task of managing the firm. The horizontal dimension is between dominant 
shareholders and dispersed shareholders. The horizontal focus is on preventing or 
minimizing the shifts in value from dispersed outsiders to controlling inside 
stockholders. 
 
Becht et al. (2003: 41) discuss a number of issues of corporate governance that often 
appear in both practical and academic literature. These issues relate to the following 
questions: Who should participate in corporate governance? How to solve the 
collective action problem of supervising management? How to regulate takeovers 
and the actions of large investors? How boards should be structured? How managers’ 
fiduciary duties should be defined? What are appropriate legal actions against 
managerial abuses? How to discipline the management? Particularly the issue of 
disciplining management has received much attention in the academic literature on 
corporate governance. The solution to this agency problem is often a combination of 
the following disciplinary mechanisms (Becht et al., 2003; Cools, 2005): 
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Election of a board of directors representing shareholder’s interests, to which the 
CEO is accountable; monitoring of the firm by the market, including the effect of 
competition on product markets, labor markets and resource markets; the threat of a 
hostile takeover (in case of the company is under-performing);active and continuous 
monitoring by a large shareholder; alignment of managerial interests with investors 
through executive compensation contracts; legislation, as well as codes of conduct. 
 
Williamson (2008: 254) argues that “the board in practice is at a huge disadvantage 
to the top management of the corporation in information and expertise respects. 
Thus, whereas the management is involved with the corporation on a full-time basis 
and has the benefit of accounting, legal, financial, engineering, planning, and 
managerial staff expertise to track and interpret the past performance of the firm and 
develop projections for the future, the membership of the board is part-time and lacks 
firm-specific knowledge in all of these respects.” Because of this asymmetric 
information between board and management, Williamson (2008: 259) emphasizes 
that delegation is an efficient means by which to assign problems to those with the 
better training, ability, and/or deeper knowledge of the particulars (to include tacit 
knowledge acquired through learning by doing). 
 
Organization theory often emphasizes the advantages of delegating decision-making 
to professional management. The key issue is asymmetric information between 
principal and agent, in our case between board of directors and management. While 
the board may have formal authority (partly shared with the general assembly), the 
real authority may lie with the management due to its superior knowledge of both the 
firm and the competitive environment. 
25 
 
 
 
When the board does not hold real authority, it may better delegate formal authority. 
Aghion and Tirole (1997), in their theoretical paper on the allocation of formal and 
real authority, suggest that “the delegation of formal authority to a subordinate will 
both facilitate the agent’s participation in the organization and foster his incentives to 
acquire relevant information about the corresponding activities”. However, 
delegation involves a costly loss of control for the principal. As a result of this trade-
off, formal authority will not be delegated for all decisions. Aghion and Tirole (1997) 
found that formal authority is more likely to be delegated for decisions that (among 
others) are sufficiently innovative that the principal has not accumulated substantial 
prior expertise or competencies. 
 
Not all of these issues in the debate on corporate governance are relevant for 
cooperatives, as they have special ownership and governance features. Hendrikse and 
Veerman (2004) have identified a number of differences between cooperatives and 
investor-owned firms. First, in marketing cooperatives farmer-members often depend 
to a large extent for their income on the performance of the cooperative. The 
relationship between farmer-member and marketing cooperative is usually 
characterized by high asset specificity, which leads to high switching costs for the 
farmer if he has to terminate his membership. Farmers and their boards have a strong 
incentive to perform their job in controlling the management (Hansmann, 1996). 
 
Second, farmers have invested in their cooperatives, if not on purpose then, at least 
by the earnings that have been retained by the cooperative. However, cooperatives do 
not issue shares, or if they do, these shares are not tradable. Thus, again, members 
and their boards have a strong incentive to supervise the management. Other 
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differences in corporate governance mechanisms between cooperatives and investor-
owned firms relate to disciplining the management (Staatz, 1987; Trechter et al., 
1997). Cooperatives do not have external mechanisms for disciplining the 
management. Unlike listed companies that are scrutinized by the financial media (on 
behalf of current and potential shareholders, there is no external financial assessment 
of the performance of the cooperative (and its management). Also the threat of 
hostile takeover is not available for disciplining the management. Finally, the 
alignment of managerial interests with members through executive compensation 
contracts is more complicated in cooperatives compared to listed companies, who 
can use the share price as a performance measure and can use shares and share 
options as part of the remuneration package. These differences imply that for 
disciplining the management cooperatives rely on active and continuous monitoring 
by the board of directors. Also legislation and codes of conduct may be relatively 
more important for cooperatives. 
 
The issue of the allocation of formal and real authority and of delegation is 
particularly relevant for cooperatives. As the board consists of farmers who have no 
experience in running a large commercial firm and are only part-time board 
members, and the management has much better information on the key capabilities 
of the firm as well as on the strategies of its competitors, the board is likely to 
delegate part of its formal authority to the management. Also the findings of Aghion 
and Tirole (1997) that formal authority is most likely to be delegated for innovative 
projects seem to be particularly relevant for cooperatives developing branded product 
positions in consumer markets. Examples of governance problems in cooperatives  
include directors becoming rent-seekers, taking steps to make sure that members 
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cannot participate, becoming self-perpetuating groups, holding meetings without 
telling members, and giving themselves inappropriate loans. ICA-America estimates 
that approximately 95% of the co-operatives in the Latin America region do not have 
mechanisms in place to evaluate the performance of directors.  
2.4.2 Empirical Studies in Tanzania 
The board of directors is a critical link between members of the co-operative and the 
managers. Among its key functions are establishing performance targets, the 
employment/dismissal of management, definition and validation of remuneration 
policy, and oversight of overall co-operative operations. The role, cohesion, 
solidarity and integrity of the board of directors are essential elements for the 
performance and relevance of the co-operative within the market place and its 
broader social setting. Therefore it is key to have clear procedures for the selection 
and election of directors, plus to provide induction programmes and on-going 
training and professional development. (Show  2006) 
 
If directors are not full-time positions, lack the relevant education to exercise their 
functions, cannot read balance sheets, etc., then managers can exploit these gaps in 
many ways, including the demutualization of co-operatives when it brings economic 
benefits to managers. Managers can get away with abuse if they exercise unchecked 
powers. Here, external directors play a fundamental role: bringing commercial 
acumen and a challenging ability to management actions and decisions (ECA 2002).  
 
However, it is very common to confuse the responsibilities of each actor, even 
among the office holders. In Kenya, for example, the Supervisory Committee 
oversees that the Board of Directors performs the functions that it is expected to 
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carry out, and reports its findings to shareholders. However, candidates who are 
appointed to the Supervisory Committee as a rule seek office to the Board of 
Directors, which points to the perceived inferiority of their oversight office in 
relation to the management functions of the Board of Directors. (Wanyama, et al 
2006). There is a pressing need to address the corruption problem that arises from 
having board of directors performing functions on a voluntary basis. But even if the 
work of directors continues on a voluntary basis, the co-operative annual report 
should specify the benefits and entitlements that they receive in compensation. The 
point is to promote transparency and not whether services should be voluntary or 
under a remuneration policy.  
 
The Cooperative reform Programmeme has proposed the following intervention to 
promote good governance in Cooperative societies (i) Initiate process of election of 
competent leaders (ii) facilitate training in good governance of cooperative board 
leaders and selected membership;(iii) Institute an effective inspection and audit 
system;(iv) evolve system of  employment which is based on fixed term contract in 
all societies;(v)employ competent personnel(define necessary qualification at 
different levels);(vi)screen leadership and management following procedures 
introduced by code of conduct;(vii) take quick appropriate legal action where 
necessary(use of surcharge, special prosecutors).  
 
2.5 Research Gap 
While studies have been conducted on corporate governance in cooperatives, little is 
known of studies that assess the level of adoption of corporate governance by 
SACCOs. The studies have been around various issues of corporate governance 
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including financial management by Hendrikse and Veerman (2004), corporate 
governance challenges by Aghion and Tirole (1997) and issues of procedure for 
board and directors selection and training by Show (2006) among others. 
Furthermore, there is scanty knowledge about whether comparative studies to 
compare the level of adoption of corporate governance measures between 
community based SACCOs and work based SACCOs have been carried out. 
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Figure 2.5.2 Conceptual Framework  
Source: Constructed by Researcher, 2010  
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2.6 Hypotheses 
Ho1.  There is no significant difference in the extent to which SACCOS have 
adopted code of conduct for boards and management between work based and 
community based SACCOS. 
Ho2.  There is no significant difference in the extent to which SACCOS have 
adopted practices to foster member participation between work based and 
community based SACCOS. 
Ho3.  There is no significant difference in the extent to which SACCOS have 
complied with various regulations between work based and community based 
SACCOS. 
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 CHAPTER THREE 
3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Overview 
This chapter describes the design of the research, the strategies employed, the 
population and sampling procedures, variables and measurement procedures, 
methods of data collection, data analysis. Section 3.2 covers research design and 
strategy, section 3.3 describes the population of the study while section 3.4 indicates 
study area and section 3.5 covers the sampling frame.  
 
3.2 Research Design and Strategy 
In conducting this research, a descriptive survey design was used. The descriptive 
survey design was also of benefit as it allowed description of particular 
characteristics of the population, at a point in time or at varying times for 
comparative purposes. A total of 25 SACCOS, 8 from Kinondoni municipality, 11 
from Ilala municipality and 6 from Temeke municipality in Dar es Salaam region 
were used systematically selected. A questionnaire was administered to one 
respondent per SACCOS .Respondents were picked either from management, 
employees or from members depending on the availability. Both descriptive and 
independent two sample t-test were used to analyze the data. 
 
3.3 Population of the Study 
Population consisted of all the registered cooperatives in Tanzania. According to 
the yearly report issued by the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Cooperatives-
Cooperative department as at 30
th
 June 2008 registered SACCOS were 4,780 with a 
total of 713,699 members. Table 3.1 shows their distribution across regions Dar es 
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salaam had 457 SACCOS and 100,053 members is second to Mwanza which had 
606 registered SACCOS with 69,072 members. The main target respondents were 
SACCO’s members, some of whom served in the supervisory committees, board and 
executive committees and employees. 
 
3.4 Area of Study 
The study was conveniently limited to SACCOS in Dar es Salaam. The main reason 
was affordability in terms of finances and time 
Table 3.1: Registered SACCOS as at 30
th
 June 2008 
 REGION NO. OF SACCOS TOTAL MEMBERS 
ARUSHA 224 45,943 
DSM 457 100,053 
DODOMA 158 35,636 
IRINGA 185 31,489 
KAGERA 262 38,208 
KIGOMA 178 25,292 
KILIMANJARO 212 73,078 
LINDI 112 10,121 
MARA 114 9,809 
MANYARA 226 29,892 
MBEYA 298 45,449 
MOROGORO 314 41,682 
MTWARA 138 13,037 
MWANZA 606 69,072 
PWANI 271 15,431 
RUKWA 95 10,202 
RUVUMA 81 37,955 
SHINYANGA 387 36,758 
SINGIDA 95 12,516 
TABORA 193 12,678 
TANGA 174 19,398 
TOTAL 4,780 713,699 
Source:  URT, 2008  
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3.5 Sampling Frame 
The population in 3.3 was reduced to SACCOS registered and operating in Dar es 
Salaam only. This criterion led to a revised population of 457 SACCOS with total 
population of 100,053 members. Table 3.2 shows the distribution of SACCOS across 
the three municipalities in Dar es salaam. Kinondoni and Ilala District had 150 and 
198 registered SACCOS respectively while Temeke had 109 as of June 2008. For the 
purpose of this research these SACCOS are further divided among work based, 
community based and whether the SACCOS are active or dormant. 
 
The majority of SACCOS in Kinondoni and Temeke municipalities are Community 
based (77% and 57% respectively) while most of those   in Ilala are work based 
(55%). Of the SACCOS in each municipality the active ones were 79 (52.7%) 
SACCOS in Kinondoni, 109 (55.1%) SACCOS in Ilala and 71(65.1%) SACCOS in 
Temeke.  Then  of the active SACCOS  259 (56.7%),those considered in the 
sampling frame were distributed as follows: Kinondoni 79 (30.5%), Ilala 109 
(42.1%) and Temeke 71 (27.4%). 
 
Table 3.2 SACCOs Classification 
 NO. OF 
SACCOS 
ACTIVE 
SACCOS 
DORMANT 
SACCOS 
WORK 
BASED 
COMMUNITY 
BASED 
KINONDONI 150 79 71 34 116 
ILALA 198 109 89 110 88 
TEMEKE 109 71 38 47 62 
TOTAL 457 259 198 191 266 
Source: Field Survey December (2009)  
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3.6    Sampling Design and Procedures 
The nature of the problem required SACCOs which have been in operation long 
enough to have instituted governance measures. Secondly it was thought that a 
comparison between work based and community based SACCOS would enrich our 
analysis. Thus the active SACCOS were split into work based and community based 
SACCOS to ensure representation. Then SACCOS registered before 2002 were 
chosen. This approach reduced the sample further to 138 SACCOS with at least 5 
years of operation by the time of this study. It is important to note here that dormant 
SACCOS are those that are still in the register but not operating and the legal 
procedures for liquidating them have not been made.  
 
Table 3.3 presents SACCOS with at least five years of operation and their 
distribution across three municipalities and whether they are work based or 
community based SACCOS. From the refined lists, a total 25 SACCOS were 
systematically selected. For Kinondoni the first SACCOS on the  list of active 
community based and work based SACCOS was picked followed by every 6
th
 and 7
th
  
SACCOS respectively down the list. This procedure led to 8 SACCOS in total for the 
municipality split equally between community and work based categories. For Ilala 
the first SACCOS on each list of community and work based SACCOS was picked 
followed by every 4
th
 and 7
th
 SACCOS. This led to 11 SACCOS split into 3 and 8 
community based and work based respectively.  
 
 For Temeke same procedure as the one for Kinondoni was applied leading to 3 
SACCOS in each category (6 SACCOS) in all. Table 3.4 shows the result. Somehow 
in implementing this sample insignificant bias was introduced by substituting 
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SACCOS when its location was found to be very far in the outskirt. This was 
necessary for both time and financial constraints.  
 
Within a given SACCOS one respondent was conveniently targeted from among  the 
following : The Accountant, Manager and  Employee and also bearing in mind that 
the person must have been in office for more than a year to  have a proper 
understanding understanding of activities of the SACCOS. The selection of members 
considered membership period from five years as reasonable time to have the 
overview of the governance practices in the society.  
 
Table 3.3: Active SACCOS with more than five years 
DISTRICT TOTAL WORK BASED COMMUNITY BASED 
KINONDONI 42 20 22 
ILALA 63 49 14 
TEMEKE 33 18 15 
TOTAL 138 87 51 
Source: Collected from regional register in the assistant registrar –Cooperatives office 
 
Table 3.4 Societies Visited in each Municipal 
DISTRICT WORK 
BASED 
COMMUNITYBASED TOTAL 
KINONDONI 4 4 8 
ILALA 8 3 11 
TEMEKE 3 3 6 
TOTAL 15 10 25 
Source: field survey December 2009 
3.7 Data Collection 
The study collected mainly primary data based on a structured questionnaire. 
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3.7.1 Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire was designed to have 4 main sections. Section I was designed to 
collect information on the SACCOS and its respondents. It covered location and type 
of the SACCOS and the engagement of the respondent i.e whether the respondent is 
the Accountant, manager, member or employee. Sections II to IV presented several 
constructs aimed at testing for various governance practices in the sampled 
SACCOS. It covered the code of conduct for the board and management (Section II), 
membership participation (Section III), compliance to various regulations(section 
IV). Respondents were asked to indicate the extent of their agreement or 
disagreement to the specified constructs under each section ranging from strongly 
disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). 
 
3.7.2 Questionnaire Administration 
The questionnaire was self administered. The researcher facilitated the respondents 
in answering the questionnaires. This approach of administering the questionnaire 
was employed so as to enhance the response rate, ensuring that the study receives 
relevant information and that the respondents have clarity whenever needed in 
responding to the questionnaire. 
3.8 Data Processing and Analysis 
3.8.1 Data Processing 
Questionnaires were assessed for consistence and completeness. All 25 
questionnaires were found to be useful. Data were then collected and entered into 
SPSS ready for analysis. 
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3.8.2 Reliability of the Instrument 
1.The data was subjected to scale tests for reliability. The test produced a Cronbach’s 
Alpha of  0.951. All inter-item correlation coefficients are higher than 0.3 except for 
a few items namely hierarchy, SACCOS has strategic plan, external auditor’s 
independence, SACCOS accounts are prepared by leaders.3. Only 3 items – if 
deleted could improve the Cronbach’s alpha by between 0.01 and 0.08. These are 
SACCOS has a strategic plan, independence of external auditors and final accounts 
are prepared by leaders. It was concluded that comparing to the minimum cut off 
point of alpha=0.7 the instrument was reliable. Since the Cronbach’s  alpha is already 
0.951  there  was no need to delete any item. 
3.8.3 Validity  
To validate the instrument, a panel of cooperative society auditors was asked to 
review the questionnaire and advise on the areas of improvement. This process was 
done twice to validate the contents of the questionnaire. 
 
3.8.4 Data Analysis 
Cross tabulation was used to handle the distribution of sampled SACCOS based on 
location and type. The same was also done on the job position of the respondents. 
Data on sections II –IV were handled in the following manner. First, for each 
construct, respondents who scored “agree” (4) and “strongly agree” (5) were re-
scored 1 representing “agreeing” score, 0 otherwise. This was to enable the 
researcher to calculate the percentage of respondents agreeing to the construct. 
Frequencies were then prepared for each category in each section and bar charts were 
prepared isolating community based from work based SACCOS. This approach was 
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necessary to facilitate comparison of the extent of governance between the two 
groups of SACCOS. 
Secondly, mean scores were computed for each category and compared across 
SACCOS type to determine whether the extent of adoption of governance principles 
is statistically different between the two groups of SACCOS. 
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 CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Overview 
 This chapter presents the findings and discussion Section 4.2 covers SACCOS and 
respondents characteristics. Section 4 .3 covers  the code of conduct of Board and 
Management, Section 4.4 presents results on members participation  and, Section 4.5 
presents results for compliance. Finally, Section 4.6 presents discussion of the 
results.  
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The study assessed the extent of corporate governance adoption by a total of 25 work 
based SACCOS and community based SACCOs. 
 
4.2.1 Distribution of SACCOS 
From Kinondoni Municipality, four (4) work based SACCOS and four (4) 
community based SACCOS were sampled to make a total of eight (8) SACCOS. 
Eight work based SACCOS and three (3) community based SACCOs were sampled 
from Ilala to make a total of eleven (11) SACCOs from this municipality. Temeke 
municipality had three (3) work based and three (3) community based SACCOS to 
make a total of six (6) SACCOS. There were in total fifteen (15) work based 
SACCOS and ten (10) community based SACCOs from all three municipalities. This 
distribution can be seen on Table 4.1: 
Table 4.1 Distribution of SACCOS 
Municipality Types of SACCOS 
  Work based Community Based Total 
Kinondoni 4 4 8 
Ilala 8 3 11 
Temeke 3 3 6 
Total 15 10 25 
Source: Field data (2010) 
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The research had a total of 25 respondents. From work based SACCOS there were 
three (3) accountants, six (6) managers, three (3) employees and three (3) members 
to make a total of fifteen (15) respondents. From community based SACCOs, there 
was no accountant respondent, two (2) managers, three (3) employees and five (5) 
members to make a total often (10) respondents. 
Table 4.2 Distribution of Respondents 
Position of Respondent Type of SACCOS 
  Work based Community based Total 
Accountant 3 0 3 
Manager 6 2 8 
Employee 3 3 6 
Member 3 5 8 
Total 15 10 25 
Source: Field data (2010) 
 
4.3  Code of Conduct, Board and Management 
The premise of code of conduct in corporate governance is to ensure that the board 
focuses on the ends, meaning the ultimate objective(s) of the cooperative while the 
management concentrates on the means (strategies and resources to execute short 
term and long term plans to reach the cooperative objectives. The study revealed that 
all work based SACCO’s conducts election as per code of conduct. Both work based 
and community based SACCOS have a hierarchy of AGM, Board, Supervisory 
Committee and Management. 80% both SACCOS have in place a division and 
segregation of duties among board and management. Other issues of code of conduct 
adherence by the board and management are depicted on the columnar chart in 
Figure 4.1 
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Figure 4.1: Code of Conduct of the Board and Management 
Source: Field  data (2010)  
Work based SACCOS indicates strong adherence to the code of conduct of the board 
and management from the bar chart with 40% acceptance as the lowest percentage 
for transparency of board in conducting its affairs. In contrast, the community based 
SACCOS scored the lowest agreeing responses at 20% for six issues in board  
transparency, board selection under supervision, board conducting staff performance 
assessement, clear guidelines for managing risks, training in good governance and 
availability of clear and known process for executive staff while the work 
basedSACCOS scored 53.3%, 60%, 66.7%,  and 80% successivelly for former 
issues. 
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Both the work based and community based SACCOS achieved above average 
responses on training of board members before assuming responsibility 52%, 
selection of executive staff by registrar before being employed 52%,  clear and 
known process for executive staff 56%, election conducted as per code of 
conduct76%, division and segregation of duties among board and management 80% 
and 100% for hierachy structure. 
Ho1: There is no significant difference in the extent to which SACCOS have adopted 
code of conduct for boards and management between work based and community 
based SACCOS. 
 
 In testing null hypothesis one, the independent two sample test for comparison of 
mean was carried out and the results are presented in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3 Code of Conduct for Board and Management 
 
Mean scores 
Statement 
WB 
(N=15) 
CB 
(N=10) 
 T-test 
p-
values   
Election is conducted as per code of conduct 
4.27 3.40 0.000 
*
* 
Board selection in the presence of supervisor 3.53 3.20 0.091 
 Board is transparent in its conduct 3.20 2.50 0.044 * 
Leaders disclose property owner or under their 
control 
3.20 2.00 0.021 
* 
Board members are trained before assuming 
responsibility 
3.40 3.00 0.323 
 Appointment of Executives based on 
competence and fixed term 
3.80 3.10 0.142 
 Selection of Executive staff by Registrar before 
being employed 
3.67 3.30 0.252 
 Training in good governance to board, 
 management and members 
3.47 2.10 0.002 
*
* 
Board conducts staff performance assessment 3.33 2.50 0.030 * 
Clear and known process for executive staff 3.80 2.80 0.056 
 Clear guidelines for managing risk 3.40 2.50 0.050 
 Division and segregation of duties among  
board and management 
3.87 3.80 0.832 
 Hierarchy is AGM, Board, Supervisory 
 Committee and Management 
4.47 4.60 0.533 
 Overall score for Code of conduct for board and 
management 
3.65 2.98 0.017 
* 
     Note: Lavene's test of equality of variances was statistically significant at 0.05 levels for Board 
selection in the presence of supervisor.  Variances for the rest were not statistically significantly 
different, and therefore equality of variances was assumed. 
* significant at .05 level; ** significant at 0.01 level (two tail t-test) 
Source: Field Data (2010) 
Since the overall score for code of conduct for board and management is 0.017 is 
lower than 0.05, the null hypothesis one is rejected. Therefore, the testable 
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statemenent that “There is no significant difference in the extent to which SACCOS 
have adopted code of conduct for boards and management between work based and 
community based SACCOS.” was rejected. The significant attributes representing 
significant differences were: election per code of conduct, board transparency, 
disclosure of property, training for leaders and staff performance assessment. 
 
 4.4  Members’ Participation in Cooperative Affairs 
The cooperative societies Act (2003) dictate for members participation that, “Co-
operatives are democratic organizations controlled by their members, who actively 
participate in setting policies and making decisions. Men and women serving as 
elected representatives are accountable to the membership. Members contribute 
equitably to, and democratically control, the capital of their co-operative.” The study 
assessed the extent of members’ participation in cooperative affairs on the issues of 
training and seminars, contribution in general meeting, membership rights and equity 
and other stakeholders’ interests. It was found in the analysis that there are above 
average acceptance levels on issues pertaining to members’ participation in 
cooperative affairs. Opportunities to contribute at general meetings by members 
scored the highest with 64% acceptance levels in all SACCOS. 
 
Observation of members’ rights again received 64% acceptance, followed by 
recognition of stakeholders’ interests with 60% and equitable treatment of members. 
Sensitization seminars to members and induction training to members both scored 
aggregate 52% acceptance by the cooperatives. The columnar chart in figure 4.2  
presents the  results. It shows that there are notable differences between work-based 
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and community- based SACCOS in implementing measures that foster members 
participation. 
 
Figure 4.2 Members’ participation in Cooperative affairs 
Source: Field data (2010) 
 
For example , the work based SACCOs scored higher acceptance percentages than 
their counterpart community based SACCOs.  Giving opportunities to members in 
contributing in general meetings which scored the highest percentage in aggregate, 
the work based SACCOs had a 80% acceptance while the community based 
SACCOs had 40% acceptance level. The community based SACCOs  scored highest 
reponse rate on observation of members rights at 50% while their counterparts scored 
73.3%  acceptance level on the same issue. The lowest acceptance level was on 
induction training to members by the community based SACCOs which scored 30% 
while for work based SACCOs the lowest acceptance level was with sensitization  
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seminars to members at 60%.The second null hypothesis was tested  and the results 
of the test are indicated on Table 4.4. 
Ho2.  There is no significant difference in the extent to which SACCOS have 
adopted practices to foster member participation between work based and 
community based SACCOS. 
Table 4.4 Members Participation 
  Mean scores 
 T-test p-
values 
Statement 
WB 
(N=15) 
CB 
(N=10) 
Induction training to members 3.60 2.70 0.019 * 
Opportunities to contribute at general  
meetings is given to members 3.93 3.50 0.111 
 Sensitization seminars to members 3.40 3.30 0.754 
 Members' rights observed 3.73 3.30 0.172 
 Members are treated equitably 3.47 2.80 0.103 
 Stakeholders' interest recognized 3.73 3.40 0.103 
 Overall score for Members Participation 3.64 3.17 0.097 *** 
     Note: Lavene's test of equality of variances was not statistically significant in all statements. 
Therefore equality of variances was assumed. 
* significant at .05 level; ***Significant at 0.10 level 
Source: field Data (2010) 
Overall, the second null hypothesis “There is no significant difference in the extent 
to which SACCOS have adopted practices to foster member participation between 
work based and community based SACCO”; is rejected. Implying that there are 
statistically significant differences in the adoption of measures that foster members 
participation in SACCOS affairs between work-based and community-based 
SACCOS. Out of the seven items tested there is also enough evidence to support that 
48 
 
 
 
the two types of SACCOS are statistically significantly different providing indication 
training to its members.  
4.5 Compliance With Various Regulations  
In financial accounting, an audit independently assesses the fairness by which a 
company's (in this case a credit cooperatives) financial statements are presented by 
its management. It is performed by competent, independent and objective person or 
persons, known as auditors or accountants, who then issue an auditor's report on the 
results of the audit. The objective of the ordinary audit of financial statements is the 
expression of an opinion of the fairness with which they present fairly, in all 
respects, financial position, result of operations, and its cash flows. 
  
The essentials for effective auditing include independence, staffing and training, 
relationships, due care, planning, controlling and recording, evaluation of the internal 
control system, evidence and reporting and follow-up
1
. Audit as one of the core 
principles of corporate governance engross internal controls and internal auditors, the 
independence of the entity's external auditors and the quality of their audits and 
oversight and management of risk. To assess its existence and support to good 
governance, the study examined whether leaders prepare society’s final accounts, 
independence of external auditors for the cooperative and inspection by cooperative 
official/supervisory committee is done.  
 
The study also assessed other issues regarding good governance as stipulated by Co-
operative Reform and Modernization Program of 2005 particularly with regard to 
                                                          
1
 Standard 300 of the SPPIA   
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compliance. These issues include presence of a strategic plan for the cooperative, 
audited accounts presented in the AGM, availability of records on attendance of 
meeting for board of directors, review of the compensation arrangements for 
executive staff, existence of proper profit distribution processes and procedures and 
cooperative compliance to legal framework and remain relevant and legitimate in 
society. Strategic plan is a roadmap that maps a clear path for the cooperatives 
present condition and a vision for the future, stating the mission, core values, 
strategic objectives and goals and a budgeted work-plan and evaluation of 
performance for achievement of the stated objective. 
 
In aggregate, the SACCOs scored the highest levels of acceptance for presentation of 
audited accounts at the AGM at 100%, followed by 84% acceptance level for 
compliance of SACCOs with legal framework, and independency of external 
auditors at 80% acceptance. Lowest score was having in place a strategic plan where 
SACCOs scored only 4% in aggregate. The findings are highly interesting and are 
presented Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3 Audit Inspection and Compliance 
Source: Field Data (2010) 
Comparing the trend between the community based SACCOs and work based 
SACCOs, the difference has not been very pronounced. The community based 
SACCOs scored the highest in independency of external auditors at 90% level of 
acceptance while the work based scored73.3% on the same. The work based 
SACCOs scored the highest for compliance of SACCOs with the legal framework at 
86.7% while the community based SACCOs scored 80% level of acceptance on the 
same. On the lowest end, the work based SACCOs scored 0% acceptance with regard 
to presence plan while the community based scored a 10% acceptance. In testing the 
third hypothesis, Table 4.5 indicates the findings:- 
Ho3.  There is no significant difference in the extent to which SACCOS have 
complied with various regulations between work based and community based 
SACCOS. 
Table 4.5 Compliance 
  Mean scores 
 T-test p-values 
Statement 
WB 
(N=15) 
CB 
(N=10) 
SACCOS has strategic plan 2.20 1.80 0.188 
 Audited accounts are presented at AGM 4.40 4.20 0.296 
 Board and Executive management trained  
in Corporate governance 
3.13 3.10 0.924 
 Board attendance records are maintained 3.67 3.80 0.757 
 Executive compensation arrangements  3.67 3.50 0.539 
 Proper profit distribution processes and  
procedures 
2.93 2.60 0.426 
 SACCOS complies with legal framework 3.87 3.90 0.924 
 SACCOS final accounts prepared by leaders 3.13 2.80 0.405 
 External Auditors are independent 4.00 4.10 0.764 
 Inspection by coop officials/Supervisory  3.33 2.60 0.152 
 Overall score for compliance 3.43 3.24 0.307   
     Note: Lavene's test of equality of variances was statistically significant at 0.05 level 
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for "Audited accounts are presented at AGM" at .05 level.  Variances for rest were 
not statistically significantly difference, and therefore equality of variances was 
assumed. 
* significant at .05 level; ** significant at 0.1 level (two tail t-test) 
Source: field data 2010 
Since the p-value for the  overall score for compliance is 0.307 and significance is 
assumed at P<0.05, then the null hypothesis “There is no significant difference in the 
extent to which SACCOS have complied with various regulations between work 
based and community based SACCOS” is accepted. This implies that there is no 
enough evidence to suggest that the two types of SACCOS differ significantly in 
complying with requirements regarding audit, inspection as well as executive 
compensation. 
 
4.6 Discussion of Findings 
Studies have argued that members and boards of cooperatives  have incentive to 
perform their job in controlling the management (Hansmann, 1996) due to high 
switching cost and investment made by members in the cooperatives (Hendrikse and 
Veerman, 2004). In general, the study indicates a considerable level of members and 
board involvement in issues of corporate governance, which support the findings of 
the previous studies. 
 
Financial reports are crucial components for an entity such as a SACCOS. Absence 
of external mechanism to discipline the management or assess the financial 
performance of the cooperatives has been underscored. However, the study found out 
that there are independent external auditors who audit the financial statements of the 
SACCOS. It was also found that the audit reports are presented at the AGM. The 
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competence of the board has been noted as a serious challenge for cooperatives in 
implementing corporate governance measures particularly due to their lack of formal 
training and experience in supervision of the management. While the study found 
that on average appointment of the executive staff is based on competence, the 
executive staffs do not receive training pre engagement. 
 
However, Show (2006) propose that it is essential to have clear procedures for the 
selection and election of directors plus provision of induction programmes and on 
going training and professional development. The study indicates in aggregate there 
is a clear and known processes for executive staff. 
 
Problems facing cooperatives as regards to corporate governance have been flagged 
such as directors become rent seekers, members non participation, meetings without 
telling members, financial misuse, absence of performance measures. This study 
found low levels of acceptance in transparency of management and the board, 
measures to assess staff performance among others. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5.0 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Overview 
This study aimed firstly, to assess the extent to which SACCOS have adopted 
measures to improve adherence to code of conduct by the board and management; 
second to assess the extent to which SACCOS provide opportunities to members’ 
participation in cooperative affairs and thirdly to assess the extent to which SACCOS 
inspection and have complied with various regulations regarding to governance 
principles. Generally, the study intended to assess the extent to which good corporate 
governance practices have been adopted in Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies. 
The study utilized descriptive survey quantitative methods of data collection and 
analysis. The target population constituted of all SACCOS within Dar es Salaam. A 
sample of 25 SACCOS were systematically selected while the respondents were to 
conveniently selected to include the , members, executive staff, and employees. A 
self-administered structured questionnaire was used to collect data from the field. 
Bar chart as well as independent two sample t-test techniques was used to analyze 
the data. 
 
5.2 Summary of the Key Findings 
The study found that the levels of acceptance for adherence to code of conduct  
above average particularly for division and segregation of duties for board, election 
is conducted, clear and known process for board, appointment of executive staff 
based on competence and training of the board prior to their engagement. On the 
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downside lack of measurements for staff performance assessment and transparency 
of the board and management are highlighted. On testing the null hypothesis to 
compare the work based SACCOS with community based SACCOS, the statement 
“There is no significant difference in the extent to which SACCOS have adopted 
code of conduct for boards and management between work based and community 
based SACCOS” was rejected. As regards to members participation, it was found 
that training to members is done, stakeholders interests are recognized, members 
contribute in general meetings and members’ rights are observed. In testing the 
second null hypothesis to compare the levels of adoption of members participation in 
cooperative affairs the statement “There is no significant difference in the extent to 
which SACCOS have adopted practices to foster member participation between work 
based and community based SACCOS” was rejected. 
 
The issues of audit inspection and compliance to various regulations, it was found 
that the cooperatives present audit report in AGM, they comply with legal 
framework, the auditors are independent and executive staff compensation is 
reviewed. However, on testing the third null hypothesis, the statement “There is no 
significant difference in the extent to which SACCOS have complied with various 
regulations between work based and community based SACCOS” was accepted. 
 
5.3 Implication of the Results 
In the current environment, SACCOs in Tanzania, in particular Dar es Salaam, are 
affected by many factors that inhibit materialization of the potential of cooperatives 
on the landscape of the economy. However, the significance of cooperatives such as 
SACCOs in Tanzania has constantly been high in the economic growth strategies. 
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Thus, the subject of good governance for the SACCOs becomes very important. The 
findings of this study supplements significant efforts that have been made to improve 
governance in cooperatives (CRMP, 2005). It has provided empirical evidence to the 
extent to which cooperatives have adopted the measures to improve governance 
practices. This study has significant implication to cooperative policy makers and 
institutions interested in cooperative movement, corporate governance and associated 
lobbyists, researchers and academicians also and hence contribute to the body of 
knowledge in the fields of Corporate Governance and of Cooperatives management 
which is fundamental for success to the economy of the country. 
 
The value of corporate governance research in Tanzania depends on its ability to 
contribute to entities performance and promote economic development. Studies 
indicate that entities operating under a volatile environment such as Tanzania require 
good corporate governance practices such as separation responsibilities, non-
executive director representation on the board and establishment of board monitoring 
committees that would improve performance. These good corporate governance 
practices were promoted by the Cadbury code (1992) for accountability, transparency 
and effective decision making processes of boards. Accordingly, this study was 
carried out to provide a useful framework for SACCOs in that are attempting to 
improve or implement corporate governance structures. 
Given the challenges facing the cooperative sector in Tanzania and its importance in 
the national economy agenda on the other hand, it becomes necessary to build 
evidence that will enhance confidence of the public and stakeholders on the 
cooperatives. The findings of this study implies that SACCOs efforts to enhance 
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members participation in cooperative affairs by holding AGMs and provide 
opportunities for members to contribute in such meetings, observing members rights 
and enhance transparency implies that SACCOs are working to meet  requirements 
of Cooperative Societies Act, 2003 and CRMP, 2005. 
 
Observing the code of conduct, proper distribution of responsibility and compliance 
to regulation pertaining to good governance of cooperative forms a base for the role 
of corporate governance of addressing the agency problem and ensuring 
maximization of shareholders’ value. Findings suggest significant level of adoption 
of SACCOs of code of conduct and compliance to regulation implying the problem 
of agency is being addressed by the SACCOs. The results of this study indicate 
substantial levels of corporate governance measures, implying the SACCOs have 
adopted good governance practice. The variation of levels of adoption of corporate 
governance measures between the Work Based SACCOs and Community Based 
SACCOs implies there is a varying level of implementing initiatives which begs the 
attention from policy makers and institutions interested in cooperative movement, 
corporate governance and associated lobbyists, researchers and academicians. 
5.4  Conclusion  
The cooperatives have adopted measures to adopt measures of corporate governance 
in Dar es Salaam including measures to improve adherence to code of conduct by 
board and management, provide opportunities to members to participate in 
cooperative affairs and comply to regulations. However there are significant 
differences in the extent of adoption of such practices between work-based and 
community based SACCOS.  
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5.5 Recommendation 
In light of the findings and conclusion of the study, the study recommends the 
following: 
The study recommends that cooperatives board and management have strategies in 
place, risk management guidelines, enhance their transparency and ensure that they 
do not influence the audit report context. Cooperative management should define 
roles and responsibilities of everyone and provide education and training on 
corporate governance, to ensure accountability and hence improve performance 
according to the hierarchy. 
Moreover, the study recommends that members of cooperatives takes a greater role 
in governance of their cooperatives, and avail themselves at least basic knowledge in 
good corporate governance, ensuring that audit are conducted in time and the ability 
and reputation of the firm that audits their cooperative which provides fair opinion of 
the cooperative’s situation. Community based SACCOs need to improve in most of 
things more than their counterpart work based SACCOs. 
5.6 Areas of Future Research 
In order to allow generalizations and comparisons for the extent of adoption of 
corporate governance in cooperatives further studies are recommended by this study, 
especially including  a larger number of cooperatives, from different regions of the 
country so as to have cooperatives that are not only of urban environment, but also to 
include cooperatives found in rural areas. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 
Corporate Governance in Cooperatives Questionnaire 
Introduction 
Greetings! I am conducting a study on the extent of corporate governance application 
in cooperatives as a partial fulfillment for an award of Masters Degree in Business 
Administration of the Open University of Tanzania. Your cooperative is part of this 
study, and you have been selected as one of respondents in this study. I request you 
formally to respond to this questionnaire which aims at assessing the extent of 
application of corporate governance in general. All the responses will be 
confidential, known only to the researcher. You are allowed to interfere the 
responses any time. Please, feel free to respond as your replies will enable the 
researcher to know the extent of which corporate governance is applied in this 
cooperative. 
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RESPONDENT’S DETAILS 
1. Location of SACCOs  
 Kinondoni   
 Ilala   
 Temeke 
2. Type of SACCOs –  
Work based     
Community based  
3. Position in the cooperative:  
employee 
 member  
accountant  
 Manager 
                  
Please rate your acceptance level on corporate governance issues in your cooperative 
by circling from the 5 point scale below that reflects your acceptance level. 
Score Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
Distribution 1 2 3 4 5 
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II: CODE OF CONDUCT BOARD AND MANAGEMENT  
1. Election is conducted as per the code of conduct(ELECT) 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Board election is conducted in the presence of election 
supervisor(BESUP) 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. The board is transparent in its conducts(BTANS) 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Leaders disclose property owned or under their control every 
year(PROPDISC) 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Board members trained before assuming their 
responsibilities(BTRAIN) 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. The  appointment of executive staffs based on competence and 
fixed term contract(AECOMP) 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Selection of Executive Staff is done by registrar before being 
employed(SEREG) 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Training in good governance to board, management and 
members conducted(GGTRAIN) 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. The  board conduct staff performance assessment(BSPERF) 1 2 3 4 5 
10. There are clear and known process for executive staff(OPROC) 1 2 3 4 5 
11. The board has provided clear guidelines for  management of 
risk(CRMGUIDE) 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. There is clear division and segregation of duties  among the 
board and management(DSDUTIES) 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. The hierarchy of the society is the AGM, board, supervisory 
committee and management(HIERARCH) 
1 2 3 4 5 
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III: MEMBERS PARTICIPATION  
14 Members provided with induction training(MTIND) 1 2 3 4 5 
15 Members are availed opportunities to contribute actively in 
the general meeting(MOPPORT) 
1 2 3 4 5 
16 Seminars conducted to sensitize  members(MSEMINAR) 1 2 3 4 5 
17 Members rights are observed (MRIGHTS) 1 2 3 4 5 
18 Members are treated equitably(MEQUITY)      
19 Interests of other stakeholders such as buyers, consumers, 
community, and government are recognized.(STAKEH) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
        IV: COMPLIANCE TO VARIOUS REGULATIONS 
20 The society has  strategic plan (SPLAN) 1 2 3 4 5 
21 Audited accounts presented in the Annual General Meeting 
(ACAGM) 
1 2 3 4 5 
22 Board and executive management are  trained on corporate 
governance (BETCGO) 
1 2 3 4 5 
23 There are records on attendance of meeting for Board of 
Directors (BATTR) 
1 2 3 4 5 
24 Review of the compensation arrangements for executive 
staff (EXCOMPR) 
1 2 3 4 5 
25 There is  proper profit distribution processes and procedures 
(PROFDIST) 
1 2 3 4 5 
26  Cooperative  comply with legal framework and remain 
relevant and legitimate in society(LEGALF) 
1 2 3 4 5 
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27 Society’s final accounts are prepared by the leaders 
(SFACCL) 
1 2 3 4 5 
28 The external auditors for the cooperative are independent 
(EXTAUD) 
1 2 3 4 5 
29 Inspection by cooperative official/supervisory committee is 
done (INSP) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
                                                          
 
 
